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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme (ourt of the United States.
ALFRED 11. ANDREWS ET AL. v. HENRY M. CONGAR.
According to the law of Illinois as settled by the decisions of its tribunals, the
presumption as to the liability assumed by one who endorses a note to which he is
not a party, is that he is a guarantor, but this presumption may be rebutted by evi-
dence that at the time of endorsement he stipulated for a different liability.
It is no ground for reversal at the suit of such endorser that the court below by
following the law of the forum instead of the law of the state where the note was
made and payable, instructed the jury that his presumed liability was that of an
endorser when it was in' fact that of a joint maker.
Where by statute a defendant is not allowed to deny the execution of the instru-
ment sued on unless his plea be verified by affidavit and in a suit upon a guaranty
endorsed on a note the defendant verifies his plea of general issue, by affidavit, the
plaintiff is only bound to prove the execution of the guaranty and not the execution
of the note.
A secret agreement between partners not to assume any liability out of the line
of the partnership business, is no defence to an action on the endorsement of a cor-
poration note, signed by one partner in the name of the firm, when it appears that
the partners were the owners of a majority of the stock of the corporation, and that
the note and endorsement were given for the benefit of that stock.
'Where the maker of a note has an account on his books with the holder as to
other transactions, which account has been balanced, showing nothing due by the
holder, the guarantor of the note, when sued by the holder, cannot set up as a defence
the items on the debit side of such account, without allowing the credits, or showing
fraud or mistake in striking the balance.
IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the North-
ern District of Illinois.
Mr. Chief Justice WAITE delivered the opinion of the court
There are nineteen errors assigned on this record, but those
relied on in the argument present in reality but four questions.
These are :
1. Whether the court erred in charging the jury that "if a
person not a party to a note, that is to say, not the payee or maker,
writes his name on the back of the note at the time the note is
made, the presumption is that he has assumed the liabilities anu
responsibilities of a guarantor; this presumption, however, is liable
to be rebutted by the proof."
2. Whether, under the practice in Illinois, which is regulated by
statute, if one is sued as a guarantor of a note, and he verifies his
plea of the geneial issue by affidavit, the plaintiff must prove- the
execution of the note itself as well as the guaranty.
3. Whether the defendants should have been permitted to prove
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that there was an agreement between themselves as partners, that
neither of them should assume any liability on behalf of the firm
out of the line of its regular business without the consent of the
others, and that one of the defendants did not know that the liabil-
ity sued on was incurred until long after the notes were made and
endorsed, and that since he learned it he has always repudiated it.
4. Whether it was wrong for the court to instruct the jury that
if, as between the plaintiff and the maker of the note, the maker
could not use an account on its books as a set-off against the note,
the defendants as guarantors could not.
As to the first question, the charge as given states correctly the
law of Illinois, as-settled by the highest court of the state in a long
series of decisions: Cushman v. Dement, 3 Scam. 497; Stowell
v. Raymond, 83 Ill. 120. The contract, however, was made in
Missouri, and was to be performed there. In that state the rule is
that he who writes his name on the back of a note, of which he is
neither the maker nor the payee, is prima facie liable as a joint
maker: Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo. 440 ; Schneider v. Seiffman, 20
Id. 571 ; Otto v. Bent, 48 Id. 26; Baker v. Block, 30 Id. 225.
For this reason it is insisted that the contract is governed by the
laws of Missouri, and that the jury should have been so instructed.
Admitting this to be true, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs in
error have been harmed by the charge of which they complain.
They claim to have been presumptively joint makers of the note,
while the court told the jury they were guarantors only. Clearly
the charge as given was more favorable than the one contended for.
A recovery could have been had against them as joint makers under
the common counts.
The court, however, after stating what the 
presumption from
such an endorsement was, went on to say, "the law authorizes the
holder of a note to write over the name thus written across the back
of the note any agreement consistent with that made between ihe
parties at the time the name was placed there; that is to say,- if
the party did actually, at the time he put his name on the back of
the note, stipulate for any liability short of a guaranty, or different
from that of the guarantor, then the holder of the note had no
right to write a false guaranty over the name." Then after calling
attention to the facts which had been shown in evidence, and the
claims of the respective parties, it was said: "If you are satisfied
that the defendants in this case put their names upon the note at
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the time it was made, with the express understanding that they
were to be liable as endorsers, that is, liable after the plaintiff had
used due diligence to fix their liability as endorsers, then the de-
fendants are not liable in this action; but if, on the contrary, you
are satisfied from all the evidence in the case that the defendants
intended to become liable to pay the debt if the maker (lid not, that
is, that they would stand in the relation of sureties and guarantors,
substantially as the contract is now written over their names, then
the defendants are liable." And again, after referring to a condi-
tion which it was proved the plaintiffs in error had incorporated
into the obligation they assumed, and which it was insisted should
have been expressed in the guaranty as written over their signature,
the court said: "If you are satisfied that the positive performance
of this part of the agreement was thus waived or abrogated by
mutual consent of the plaintiff and defendants before the guaranty
was written, then no mention may be made of it." In this way,
as it seems to us, the case upon this point was fairly put to the jury
and the plaintiffs in error were given the benefit of every circum-
stance they relied on to establish their defence. If the presump-
tion arising from their endorsement had been overcome by the
evidence, the jury were told in express terms to find accordingly.
As to the second question. A statute of Illinois provides that
"no person shall be permitted to deny on trial the execution or
assignment of an instrument in writing * * * upon which any
action may have been brought * * * or is admissible in evidence
under the pleadings, when a copy is filed, unless the person so
denying the same shall, if defendant, verify his plea by affidavit :"
fll. Stat., chap. 110, sect. 34.
This action was brought on a guaranty, a copy of which was
filed. The affidavit only made it necessary to prove the execution
of that instrument. That was done, and that of itself was equiv-
alent to proof of an admission by the guarantors of the due execu-
tion of the note. Whether this admission was one that could be
contradicted, need not now be determined. It was sufficient until
overcome.
As to the third question. There is nothing in the case to show,
or tending to show, that the execution of the guaranty was not in
the line of the regular business of the partnership. On the con-
trary, it does appear that the partners were the owners of a
majority of the stock in the corporation that made the note, and
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that the note and guaranty were given with a view to the protec-
tion and improvement in value of that stock. The transaction was
one which appears to have been entered into for the common ben-
efit of all the partners. Under such circumstances, it is of no
consequence what the secret understanding of the partners may
have been as to the powers of each. The contract being within
the scope of the partnership business, each partner is presumed to
be the authorized agent of all.
As to the fourth question. A simple statement of the facts is all
that is necessary to dispose of this question. The plaintiff was
the president of the corporation, maker of the note guaranteed.
On the books he was charged with moneys paid to him from time
to time and credited with a salary and interest on his investment
in stock. After he went out of office his successor settled with
him and paid the balance found to be his due. The books were
thereupon balanced: The plaintiffs in error sought to set off
against their liability as guarantors of the note, the items which
appeared on the debit side of the account, without any regard to
the credits. As to this, the court instructed the jury that they
"must be satisfied that the company itself could use the same set-
off against the note before the defendants could avail themselves
of it, and that if they were satisfied from the evidence that the
plaintiff's account stood balanced on the books of the company as
kept, then the defendants could not set up the account as a set-off
to the note without showing fraud or mistake in striking such bal-
ance." There can be no doubt as to the correctness of this ruling.
This covers, substantially, all there is in the case. The other
errors assigned are unimportant
cially.
The liability of a stranger to a note,
endorsing the same before delivery, by
writing his name on the back of the
instrument, with the intention of giving
the maker credit with the payee, is one
of the most perplexing as well as one
of the most important of all the ques-
tions connected with the law of com-
mercial paper. The investigation of
the subject shows that in almost every
state, indeed in every state with the
exception of Florida, an opinion has
been expressed as to the nature of the
and need not be considered spe-
The judgment is affirmed.
liability assumed under such circum-
stances. But the conclusions reached
have been so various that it becomes
highly desirable to know which, of the
several theories which prevail, the courts
of each state have adopted as the rule
within their respective jurisdictions.
And first it is necessary to distinguish
the question involved from that which
arises when the note endorsed before
negotiation is payable to the maker or
order. In the latter case it is evident
that no valid obligation can be created
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against the maker until indorsed by him
and transferred. And it has been held
that in cases of this character the one so
indorsing shall be liable as a second
indorser : Blatchford v. Miliken, 35 Ill.
434 (1864). ]n Bigelow v. Colton, 13
Gray 309 (1859), the note was payable
to maker or order and was indorsed by
the maker before the third party in-
dorsed, and he was held liable only as
indorser. In .Dubois v. Mason, 127
Mass. 37 (1879), the note was also
payable to maker or order, but the third
party indorsed before the indorsement
by the maker. It was held that he was
liable, merely as an indorser. "The
liability of a party," said the court,
"whose name appears on the -back of a
negotiable note is determined by the
position of his signature with reference
to other parties, at the time when the
note first takes effect by delivery.
When a note is payable to the maker's
own order, it can take effect only when
indorsed and delivered by him." It is
also necessary to distinguish the question
involved from that which arises when
the note is endorsed by a third party
after its delivery and before its endorse-
ment by the payee, who is not the
maker, and when the endorsement is not
in pursuance of any agreement entered
into prior to the delivery of the note.
In such case there must be a new con-
sideration to support the contract, and
it is conceded that the liability is that of
a guarantor. See Rey r. Simpson, 22
How. 341 (1859) ; Good v. Martin, 95
U. S. 90 (1877) ; Colburn v. Averill. 30
Me. 310 (1849).
What then is the liability a9sumed
when a third person endorses a note, at
the time of its execution and before its
delivery to the payee, for the purpose of
giving credit to the maker with the
payee?
I. In the majority of the states it has
been settled that in the absence of proof
to the contrary, the liability assumed
under such circumstances will be pre-
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sumed to have been that of an original
promisor, or joint maker. The argu-
ment advanced in support of this theory
is 1, that the party cannot be held as a
first endorser, for the reason that he is
not the payee, and that no party but the
payee can be first endorser, and put the
instrument in circulation as a commer-
cial negotiable security. 2. That no
party can be presumed to be a second
endorser except one to whom the instru-
ment has been indorsed and who has
passed title to another. That if a per-
son indorsing in blank before delivery
desires to limit his obligation to that of
a second indorser, he must employ pro-
per terms to signify that intention, the
rule being that a blank indorsement sup-
poses that there are no such terms em-
ployed. 3. That the party cannot be
held as a guarantor, for the reason that a
guaranty is a collateral engagement to
answer for the debt, default or niscar-
riage of another person, and that as such
the agreement should be in writing
signed by the party to be charged. The
party's signature is there but the collat-
eral agreement is not. 4. Then it is
said, too, that the contract or obligation
is ambiguous because the party has failed
to clearly express his intentions, and
that it should therefore be interpreted
most strongly against himself and in
favor of the payee. That as he cannot
be held either as endorser or guarantor,
he must be held as an original promisor,
as it is clear that he intended to be liable
in some form.
This doctrine prevails as follows:
United States Supreme Court, Rey v.
Simpson, 22 How. 341 (1859), upon
appeal from the territorial court of
Minnesota; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S.
90 (1877), upon appeal from the terri-
torial court of Colorado. In this case
the court say: "Reasonable doubt of
the correctness of that rule cannot be en-
tertained." Where the Supreme Court
is compelled to pass upon a contract of
this character, which comes from a state
ANDREWS
in which the character of the obligation
has been settled by adjudication, the
court would undoubtedly interpret the
contract in accordance with the recog-
nised rule prevailing in such state.
Arkansas : Killian v. Ashley, 24 Ark.
511, 515 (1867).
Colorado: Good v. Martin, 1 Col.
165 (1869); Best v. Hoppie, 3 Id. 137
(1876). In the first of these cases it
is said that a party is presumed to be
an endorser from the fact that his name
is on the back of the note, but that as
soon as it is shown that he signed the
note before its delivery to the payee he
is primafade a joint maker of the note.
Delaware: Massey v. Turner, 2
Houston 79 (1858); Gi!pin v. Marley,
4 Id. 284 (1871).
Georgia: Collins v. Everett, 4 Ga.
273 (1848) ; Quin v. Sterne, 26 Id.
224 (1858). In the first of these
cases the court was of opinion that
at common law the liability assumed
under such circumstances, would have
been that of a second endorser, but
that under the statutes of Georgia
the party ought to be held liable as a
joint maker.
Louisiana: Smith v. Gorton, 10 La.
Rep. 374 (1836) ; Lawrence v. Oake,
14 Id. 389 (184G); Chorn v. Merrill,
9 La. Ann. 533 (1854); Collins v.
Trist, 20 Id. 350 (1868). In these
cases a party so signing is called a
"surety," and is said to be liable as an
original promisor.
Maine: Colburn v. Averill, 30 Me.
310 (1849); Malbon v. Southard, 36
Id. 147 (1853); Lowell v. Gage, 38
Id. 35 (1854); Woodman v. Boothby,
66 Id. 391 (1876).
Massachusetts: Moies v. Bird, 11
Mass. 436 (1810); (haffee v. Jones,
19 Pick. 260 (1837); Union Bank
v. Wdlis, 8 Met. 504 (1844) ;
Bryant v. Eastman, 7 Cush. 113
(1851); Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass.
179 (1868); Way v. Butterworth, 108
Id. 509 (1871) ; Woods v. Woods,
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127 Id. 141 (1879). And in this
state it was held, contrary to the rule
which generally prevails, that parol evi-
dence was not admissible to controvert
the presumption that the party intended
to bind himself as an original promisor:
Way v. Butterworth, supra (1871);
Allen v. Brown, 24 Mass. 77 (1878) ;
Gilson v. Stevens Machine Company,
Id. 546 (1878). In 1874, however,
the legislature of the state interposed,
and passed an act which provided as fol-
lows: "Ali persons becoming parties
to promissory notes payable on time, by
a signature in blank on the back thereof,
shall be entitled to notice of the non-
payment thereof, the same as endorsers.'
See National Bank v. Law, 127 Mass.
72 (1879).
Maryland: Sullivan v. wleti, 6 Gill.
181 (1847) ; Ives v. Bosley, 35 Md. 263
(1871) ; ThirdNat. Bank v. Lange, 51
Id. 138, 145 (1878).
Michigan: Wetherwax v. Paine, 2
Mich. 555 (1843) ; Rothschild v.
Grix, 31 Id. 150 (1875); Herbage v.
McEntee, 40 Id. 337 (1879).
Minnesota: Pierse v. Irvine, 1 Miun.
369 (1857); McComb v. Thompson, 2
Id. 139 (1858); Marienthal v. Tay-
lor, Id. 147 (1858) ; Robinson v. Bart-
lett, 11 Id. 411 (1866) ; Stein v.
Passnwre, 25 Id. 256 (1878).
Missouri: Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo.
440 (1842) ; Lewis v. Harvey, 18 Id. 74
(1853) ; Western Boatmen's Assoc. v.
Woff, 45 Id. 104 (1869); Kuntz v.
Tempel, 48 Id. 71 (1871); Mammon
v. Hartman, 51 Id. 168 (1872), and
the cases cited in the principal case.
New Hampshire: Martin v. Boyd, 11
N. H. 385 (1840) ; Currier v. Fellows,
27 Id. 366 (1853).
New York: Provided the note is a
non-negotiable one, the person signing in
blank on the back and before its delivery
may be held liable as a joint maker or a
guarantor, according to the intent of the
parties. But it does not appear to have
been decided in which capacity the court
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will presume that he signed the instru-
ment. See Griswold v. Slocum, 10
Barb. 402 (1851); Richards v. War-
ring, I Keyes 576 (1864); Cromwell v.
Hewttt, 40 N. Y. 492 (1869). In the
earlier New York cases it seems to have
been thought that a person signing a
negotiable note under such circumstances,
was liable as a joint maker, but these
cases have been overruled, and a dis-
tinction is now taken by the courts of
that state between negotiable and non-
negotiable instruments. While he may
be a joint maker as to non-negotiable
instruments, he cannot be held as such if
the note was negotiable. What liability
he assumes in the latter case will appear
hereafter. This distinction between
negotiable and non-negotiable paper,
does not seem to be elsewhere recog-
nised, and has been expressly repudiated
in the following cases: Sumner v. Gay, 4
Pick. 311 (1808); Perkins v. Catlin, 11
Conn. 213 (1836); Lewisv. Harvey, 18
Mo. 74, 76 (1853) ; Kuntz v. Tempel,
48 Id. 71, 77 (1871): Champion v.
Grffllth, 13 Ohio 228 (1844); Roths-
child v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150 (1875);
Herbage v. McEntee, 40 Id. 337
(1879) ; Burton v. Hansford, 10 W.
Va. 470, 483 (1877) ; Chaddock v.
Vanness, 35 N. J. 517 (1871). In
commenting on this distinction and
expressly repudiating it, Mr. Chief Jus-
tiee GnAvs of Michigan says: "It is
somewhat noteworthy that in that state,
where has sprung up this distinction ex-
cluding liability as original promisor in
case the note has words of negotiability,
the very cases in which the courts first
dealt with such contracts, and first
recognised and affirmed the liability as
original promisor, were exclusively cases
where the note contained negotiable terms.
Herrick v. Carman, 12 J. R. 160 ; Nel-
son v. Dubois, 13 Id. 175 ; Campbell v.
Butler, 14 Id. 349; Labron v. Woram,
1 Hill 93. It was not, it would seem,
until Dean v. Hall, in 1837 (17 Wend.
214), that it was judicially suggested
that the right to charge the backer as
an original promisor applied only to non-
negotiable paper. But Judge COwEN,
who gave the opinion in that case,
noticed the previous decisions and pro-
ceeded to remark, that in his judgment
they went no further than to establish
that where the defendant was privy to
the consideration and endorsed the note,
I it being non-negotiable, or at most one
payable to order, or to the plaintiff or
bearer and not negotiated, the declaration
might charge the defendant directly as
maker. In Seabury v. Hungerford, 2
Hill 80, a majority of the court pro-
ceeded ostensibly on the distinction thus
broached by Judge CowEN, but appear
to have gone somewhat further; and at
length in Hall v. Newcomb, 7 Hill 416,
the court for the correction of errors, by
a vote of seventeen to eight, took the
final step, and decided that the under-
taking of the backer of paper having
negotiable terms was that of endorser
merely. The proposition was strongly
contested by members of the court, and
only prevailed after a second argu-
ment." See Rothschild v. Grix, 31
Mich. 150, 154.
North Carolina: Such an endorser of
commercial paper is here regarded as
prima facie a joint maker: Baker v.
Robinson, 63 N. C. 192 (1869) ; Roff-
man v. Moore, 82 Id. 313 (1880).
In the last cited case it is said that in
order to rebut this presumption, a con-
trary intent must be proven, and "the
intent must be not only that of the per-
son signing but that of the person to
whom the note is payable, and the ex-
planatory evidence is only competent in
a controversy between them, and could
not follow and affect the security when
transferred before maturity to a bona
fide endorsee for value and without
notice."
Ohio : While it is presumed from the
fact that a note is endorsed by one not
the payee, and before it has been en-
dorsed by the payee, that the party has
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assumed the liability of a guarantor, yet
if it appears that the note was endorsed
before delivery and for the purpose of
giving the maker credit with the payee,
he is presumed to have assumed the
liability of a joint maker, and not that
of a guarantor: Bright v. Carpenter, 9
Ohio 139 (1839); Champion v. Gr.f-
fith, 13 Id. 228 (1844) ; Robinson
v. Ahell, 17 Id. 36 (1848) : Seymour v.
lickey, 15 Ohio N. S. 519 (1864).
Rhode Island: The party so endorsing
is prima facie liable as joint maker in
this state : Perkins v. Barstow, 6 R. I.
505 (1860) ; Matthewson v. Sprague, I
L1. 8 (1834); Manufacturers' 4- Mer-
chants' Bank v. Follitt, 11 Id. 92
(1874) ; Carpenter v. McLaughlin, 12
Id. 270 (1879).
South Carolina: The same rule pre-
vails in this state: Stoney v. Beaubien, 2
AIcMul. 313 (1842) ; Baker v. Scott, 5
Rich. 305 (1852) ; Carpenter v. Oaks,
10 Id. Eq. 17 (1856) ; 31cCrearyv. Bird,
12 Id. Law 556 (1860). Stoneyv. Beau-
bLien, it will be observed, was a compara-
tively early case. In it the court reviews
Hill v. Lewis, Skinner 410; Hodges v.
Stewart, I Salk. 1235 ; and Nicholson v.
Sedgwick, 1 Ld. Raym. 180, and says:
"These cases abundantly prove that
one who writes his name on the back of
a note payable to bearer becomes origi-
nally liable for the contents." as other-
wise no legal effect would result from
the endorsement, and the same principle
is regarded as applicable when a third
party indorses before the delivery of a
note to the payee.
Texas: The liability assumed by such
an endorsement is prima facie that of an
original promisor: Cook v. Southwick, 9
Texas 615 (1853) ; Cart v. Rowland,
14 Id. 275 (1855).
Vermont: Such is the rule in -this
state; Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355
(1848).
11. In New Jersey, no legal presump-
tion arises as to the liability which is
assumed by such an endorsement. It is
there held that the mere signature of
a third person creates per se no implied
or commercial contract whatever. That
the liability will be that of a second en-
dorser or that of a surety, according to
the intention with which he became a
party, and that that intent must be
shown by parol evidence. But it ap-
pears that if the signature was placed
there before delivery of the note and to
give the maker credit with the payee.
that the liability is that of a surety unless
some different intent is shown: Chad-
dock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. 516 (1871).
In Virginia, such an endorser is not
presumed to be either an original promi-
sor, a guarantor, a first or a second
endorser. But it is held that such a
blank endorsement impnes that the party
making it intended that the payee should
have a right to elect in what capacity he
would hold the party liable : Orr0kc v.
Colston, 7 Gratt. 189, 199 (1850).
Such is the rule in West Virginia also:
Burton v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470,
471 (1877). In this case, the cases in
Virginia are reviewed, and the court
say: "I conclude that when a negotia-
ble promissory note, made payable to a
particular person or order, is first en-
dorsed by a third person, and then
delivered to the payee, such endorser is
primafacie an original promisor or guar-
antor, as the payee may elect, or the
payee may by endorsing his name above
that of such third person, and transfer-
ring the note, make him a second en-
dorser in the commercial sense. But
the true nature of the transaction, and
the understanding of the parties to it at
the time, may be shown by parol proof,
and such proof may destroy this right of
election by the payee, and the third per-
son backing such note may be held liable
only as an original psomisor, or as a
guarantor, or as an endorser, according
to the nature of the tUansaction, and the
original understai.dhig of the parties to
it. If it is shovr. &y evidence that such
third person sigN.., is name on the back
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of such a note at the time it was made
as security for the maker and for his
accommodation, to give him credit with
the payeee, such proof does not alter the
right of the payee to hold him bound as
original promisor, or as guarantor, or as
endorser, as he may elect, but strengthens
his prima fade right to elect. Such
option may be exercised at any time by
the payee, and so long as he holds the
note, may be changed at his pleasure,
even after the institution of a suit by
him against such third person. If it be
shown that the understanding between
such third person and the payee at the
time of the transaction, was that such
third person should be bound only col-
laterally, such understanding will de-
stroy the right which the payee would
have otherwise had, of electing to hold
him bound as original promisor." The
court assume that the party who endorses
before delivery to the payee has failed to
indicate the form in which he intended
to bind himself, and that it was, there-
fore, fair to presume that he intended to
be bound in any manner that the payee
might elect.
In Connecticut, the rule which pre-
vails is said by the courts of that state
to be "peculiar" to their own jurisdic-
tion. A party so endorsing is expressly
declared not to assume the liability of a
joint maker, nor that of an absolute
guarantor, or of a second endorser. In
Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213 (1836),
it is said: "We have always rejected
the doctrine that such an endorsement
constitutes the endorser a joint maker of
the note, or an absolute guarantor,
creating a liability at all events, on the
dishonor of the note by the maker, or a
second endorser of the note, and liable
only to subsequent parties to it." And
the idea that he is a guarantor is again
expressly repudiated in Riddle v. Ste-
vens, 32 Conn. 378, 387 (1865), where
it is said that parol proof is admissible to
show that that was the liability intended
to be assumed, and thus rebut the legal
presumption as to the nature of his lia-
bility. In Perkins v. Catlin, supra, th s
liability is defined as follows: "It .waa
always the law in this state, that such an
endorsement, prima fade, implies a con-
tract on the part of the endorser, that the
note is due, that the maker shall be of
ability to pay it when it comes to matur-
ity, and that it is collectible by the use
of due diligence. * * * And if it be
said, that such construction of a blank
endorsement is peculiar to this state, it is
not the less definitely and judicially
settled because it is confined to our juris-
diction."
III. Another theory which is enter-
tained in a few of the states is, that one
who endorses a promissory note before
delivery to the payee, and for the pur-
pose of giving the maker credit, must be
prima fade regarded as a guarantor.
And this theory seems to be next in
favor to that which holds such an endor-
ser to the liability of a joint promisor.
The theory that he is a joint maker is
rejected upon the groumd that had he
intended to assume that liability he would
have signed the note upon its face, along
with the maker. The theory that he can
be held as a first or second endorser, is
not favored, for reasons already referred
to. And it is claimed that he should
therefore be held as a guarantor, and
that the promise is not within the Statute
of Frauds.
California: Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal.
485 (1852)4 Geiger v. Clark, 13 Id.
579 (1859) ; Ford v. Hendricks, 34 Id
673 (1868). As to the promise not
being within the Statute of Frauds, see
last cited case.
Illinois : Camden v. McCoy, 3 Scam.
437 (1842); Carroll v. Weld, 13 111. 682
(1852); Webster v. Cobb, 17 Id. 464
(1856); White v. Weaver, 41 Id. 409
(1866); Dietrich v. Mitchell, 43 Id. 40
(1867); Stowell v. Raymond, 83 Id. 120
(1876). In the last cited case the court
say: "Proof that the name was put
there for the purpose of becoming liable
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as security tat the makers should be
responsible for the payment of the note,
and that this endorser refused to sign as
maker will not rebut the presumption.
* * * We hold, in order to rebut the
legal presumption, the proof must be
clear and satisfactory as to a different
intention." And as the proof only went
to establish the understanding, that if
the makers did not pay, the endorser
would, it was held to constitute an abso-
lute guaranty.
Kansas : Such is the rule announced
in this state "Firman v. Blood, 2 Kans.
496 (1864); Fuller v. Scott, 8 Id. 25
(1871).
Kentucky: The rule here is the same:
Arnold v. Bryant, 8 Bush 668 (1871).
Nebraska: Such seems to be the rule
in this state: Newton Wagon Co. v.
Diers, 10 Neb. 284; 291 (1880).
Nevada: And as to the theory in this
state, see Van Doren v. Tjader, 1 Nev.
380 (1865).
The doctrine that the liability of one
so endorsing is to be regarded as that of
a guarantor, seems to have first been
expressly ruled in Illinois in Camden v.
McCoy, supra, and was based on a mis-
construction of early New York and
Massachusetts cases, especially upon cer-
tain obiter dicta contained in Herrick v.
Carman, 12 Johns. 159 (1815). In
Herrick's Case the party having en-
dorsed in blank before delivery to the
payee, he was held liable as a second
endorser, but the court expressed the
opinion that if it had appeared that he
had endorsed for the purpose of giving
the maker credit with the payee, his lia-
blity would not. have been that of a guar-
antor, but might have been converted into
such a liability. That such an endorser
wao prima fade a guarantor was never
ruled in any New York or Massachusetts
case, although the adjudications of those
states furnished the Illinois court with
the authorities upon which it arrived at
the conclusion that the liability was that
of a guarantor.
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IV. For reasons already mentioned
the theories that such an endorser ig a
joint maker, a guarantor, or a first en-
dorser are rejected, and the party is held
prma facie liable as a second endorser,
for the reason that without explanatory
evidence it is a necessary presumption
that he supposed that he would incur no
liability until after the payee had first
endorsed.
Iowa : This rule prevails in this state
and was announced in Fear v. Dunlap,
I Greene 335, (1848).
New York: The rule prevails here as
to all notes which are negotiable as dis-
tinguished from those non-negotiable:
Herrick v. Carman, 10 Johns. 224
(1813); s. c., 12 Id. 159 (1815).
Tillman v. Wheeler, 17 Id. 326 (1820) ;
Moore v. Cross, 19 New York 227
(1859) ; Bacon v. 3urnham, 37 Id. 614
(1868); Phelps v. TVischer, 50 Id. 69
(1872). If it is shown that he endorsed
before delivery of note and for the pur-
pose of giving the maker credit with the
payee, then the latter may hold him lia-
ble as a first endorser, but not as guar-
antor or maker: Spies v. Gilmore, I N.
Y. 221 (1848); Hall v. Newcomb, 7
Hill416 (1844); 3forev. Cross, supra.
Oregon: The liability is held to be
that of a second endorser" Kamm v.
Holland, 2 Oregon 59 (1863), Cogswell
v. Hayden, 5 Id. 23.
Pennsylvania: In Taylor v. McCune,
11 Penn. St. 464 (1849), it was autho-
ritatively settled that the obligation as-
sumed was that of a second endorser.
This was followed in Schollenberger v.
Nehf, 28 Penn. St. 191 (1857). The
ruling was adhered to in Jack v. 31orri-
son, - Penn. St. 116 (1864), and it
was held that parol evidence was inad-
missible to show that the liability in
tended to be assumed was that of a
guarantor. This was followed in Scha-
fer v. F. 4- M. Bank, 59 Penn. St. 144
(1868) ; s. c. 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
684. But a memorandum in writing signed
by the party to be charged is admissible
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to show that the agreement made between
the parties was that the one so endorsing
should be liable as a guarantor: Eilbert
v. Finkbeiner, 68 Penn. St. 247 (1871).
Tennessee: The liability is that of a
second endorser: Comparree v. Brockway,
11 Hum. 355 (1850) ; Clouston v. Bar-
bierre, 4 Sneed 336 (1857) ; Brinkley v.
Boyd, 9 Heisk. 149 (1872); Iser v.
Cohen, 1 Baxter 421 (1872); Rivers
v. Thomas, I Lea 649, 652 (1878).
But parol evidence is admissible to show
the true contract: Taylor v. French, 2
Lea 257 (1879).
V. The theory that such an endorser
is liable as a first endorser to the payee,
prevails as follows :
Alabama : Jordan v. Garnett, 3 Ala.
610 (1842): Milton v. DeYampert, Id.
648 (1842); Price v. Lavender, 38 Id.
389 (1862); Hooks v. Anderson, 58
Id. 238 (1877).
Indiana: Snyder v. Oatman, 16 Ind.
265 (1861) ; Drake v. Markle, 21 Id.
LINDSLEY.
433 (1863) ; Houston v. Bruner, 39 Id.
376 (1872). But the endorser may
designate the character in which he in-
tends to be bound, and such designation
will control: Phillips v. Cox, 61 Ind.
346 (1878).
Mississippi: In Jennings v. 7Tomas,
13 S. & Al. 617 (1850), the court say
that the liability of one so endorsing is
prima facie that of an endorser. It is
not entirely clear to our mind that the
court inclined to the opinion that he
would be liable prima faee as a first
endorser, though this construction is gen-
erally given to the decision.
Wisconsin: Heath v. Van Cott, 9
Wis. 516 (1859) ; Cady v. Shepard, 12
Id. 639 (1860); Davis v. Barron, 13
Id. 227 (1860); King v. Ritchie, 18 Id.
554 (1864). In Cadyv. Shepard, supra,
it is said parol proof must be introduced
to show that the endorsement was made
before that of the payee.
HENEY WADE RoGazs.
Prerogative Court of New Jersey.
JOHN B. ELLISON ET AL. V. I. H. LINDSLEY.
The time limited for creditors to file their claims with 
an assignee, under an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, expired on the 8th day of January. 
On thav
day, the appellant, a creditor residing in Philadelphia, discovered that fact, 
although,
Dy misreading his own entry, he had previously supposed 
the 18th of January was
the last day. He thereupon forwarded his claim 
to the assignee, at Newark, by
mail, which ought to have been delivered at five o'clock 
in the afternoon, but was
not, in fact, delivered until the next day. Held, 
that such claim was neither
Ipresented" nor "exhibited" to the assignee, within the terms of the statute,
within the time limited.
The Orphans' Court has no power to relieve such creditor 
on the ground that his
omission to file his claim in due time arose from 
his mistake, and not from mere
negligence.
APPEAL from decree of Essex Orphans' Court. On state of the
ease and briefs of counsel.
ELLISON v. LINDSLEY.
F. S. Figh, for appellants.
J. B. Howell, for respondents.
RUNYON, Ordinary.-The time within which the claims of cred-
itors of Herbert G. Hoole, a debtor who had assigned his property
under our Assignment Act, were, by law, to be put in to entitle
the holders to a dividend, expired on the 8th of January. The
appellants were creditors, and intended to file their claim within
the limited period, but being under a mistake, up to the 8th, as to
the time when it ended (they supposed it expired on the 18th
iustead of the 8th), they delayed filing it until the 8th, on which
day they discovered their mistake. On that day they mailed their
claim, at Philadelphia, to the assignee, at Newark, in time to
reach the latter place so as to be delivered by the letter-carrier to
the assignee at about five P. m. of that day. It was not, in fact,
delivered to him until the next day. It does not appear that it
reached Newark before the 9th. On exception to it by the as-
signee, the Orphans' Court rejected it as not filed in time, and
hence this appeal. The only question presented for decision is,
whether such posting of the claim was a "presenting" (the term
used in the third section of the act) or "exhibiting" (the term
employed in the twentieth section) of the claim within the limited
period, within the meaning of the act. It certainly cannot be held
to be so. If mailing the claim in time to reach the assignee by
due course of mail if no delay should occur, were to be held to be
equivalent to presenting or exhibiting the claim, though it should
not reach the assignee, it would, of course, be so on any other day
than the last day of the limited period as well as on that day.
The statute imposes on the assignee the duty of filing a true list
of all the creditors of the assignor, as shall claim to be such, and
requires that he do so at the expiration of three months from the
date of the assignment: Rev. 87, sect. 5. And to that end the
creditors are to present their claims under oath or affirmation:
Rev. 37, sect. 3. If they fail so to exhibit their claims within the
time limited by the act, their claims will be barred of a dividend
unless the estate shall prove sufficient, after the debts exhibited
and allowed are fully satisfied, or they shall find some other estate
not accounted for by the assignee, before distribution, in which
case they shall be entitled to a ratable proportion therefrom: sect.
20. A claim sent by mail may, of course, never reach the
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assignee. The creditor who has recourse to that method of trans.
mitting his claim takes the risk of its reaching its destination in
due time. The assignee is to know who are the creditors who
make claim as such, by their act in presenting or exhibiting their
claims within the prescribed period.
It is urged, in this case, that the failure to present the claim at
an earlier day was due to a mere mistake on the part of the appel-
lants, and that that fact entitles them to a consideration which they
could not claim if they were guilty of negligence. The alleged
mistake was wholly their own. It arose from misreading the
entry, in their own book, of the time when the limitation would
expire. The Orphans' Court has no power to relieve the appel-
lants from the consequences of their mistake. The language of
the statute is clear, and the court was not at liberty to extend it
by construction: Proprietors of Morris Aqueduct Co. ads. Jones,
7 Yr. 206; Stelle v. Conover, 3 Stew. Eq. 640. In this connec-
tion it may be added, though it has no bearing on the conclusion
reached, that the appellants had time enough, after they discovered
their mistake, to present their claim to the assignee; their error was
in trusting to the mail rather than to send a messenger.
The decree of the Orphans' Court will be affirmed, with costs.
A notice of amercement must be
served personally, on a sheriff, and not
sent by mail; Anonymous, 1 Hal. 159.
Proof of putting into the post-office a
letter containing a notice, is not sufficient
proof of service: Anonymous, 6 Hal. 94 ;
Hudson v. Henry, 1 Caines 66; Hickie's
Case, Law Rep., 4 Eq. 226 ; and see
Futcher v. Hinder, I F. & F. 357.
Where a plea was sent by mail in time,
a judgment of default for want of its
having been received, was opened: Lud-
low v. Heycraft, 2 Caines 386; Cole v.
Stafford, Cole & Caines Cas. 110; Staf-
ford v. Cole, 1 Johns. Cas. 413; so,
where the plea was received by the
plaintiff's attorney, who, on inspection,
refused to take it from the post-office :
Clark v. McFarland, 10 Wend. 635.
Notice of trial may be served by post,
unless its receipt be denied: McCourry
v. Suydam, 5 Hal. 245 ; and notice to
substitute another solicitor: Draper v.
Holland, 3 Edw. Ch. 272; and notice
to give security for costs : Abbott v.
Ledden, Bert. N. B. 33. Wilful refusal
to take from the post-office a letter con-
taining process is not service thereof:
Redpath v. Williams, 3 Bing. 443.
Contra, Aldred v. Hicks, 5 Taunt. 186.
Delivery of process sealed up in a letter,
in the absence of the person to whom it is
addressed, is only service from the time
when such letter is opened : Arrowsmith
v. Ingle, 3 Taunt 234. Service of
notice to quit, sent by mail by a land-
lord to his tenant, is invalid: Papillon
v. Brunton, 5 H. & N. 518; see May v.
Rice, 108 Mass. 150.
Qumre-Whether depositions taken
under a foreign commission may be re-
turned by mail: Simms v. Henderson,
11 Q. B. 1014.
The officer is not bound to take from
the post-office a letter containing pro-
cess, on which the postage is unpaid:
ELLISON v. LINDSLEY.
Hart v. Weatherley, 4 Dowl. P. C. 171 ;
Anonymous, I Hill 217; Brossv. Nich-
olson, I How. Pr. 158.
That a capias in another suit and a
notice of amercement were mailed to-
gether, in one envelope, to a sheriff,
more than ten days before the beginning
of the term, and the capias duly served
and returned, is not sufficient proof that
the sheriff received the notice more than
ten days before the beginning of the
term: 3elvin v. Purdy, 2 Harr. 162;
although sufficient as to their receipt;
Smith v. Campbell, 6 Dowl. P. C. 728.
Notice of an allotment of shares sent
by mail to a stockholder, and never
received, is good : Harris's Case, Law
Rep., 7 Ch. 587 ; Townsend's Case, Law
Rep., 13 *Eq. 148; Wall's Case, Law
Rep., 15 Eq. 18; but see Reidpath's
Case, Law Rep., 11 Eq. 86; British
Co. v. Colson, Law Rep., 6 Exch. 108.
Whether the person to whom a letter
is directed, after satisfactory proof of
mailing it, ever received it, is a ques-
tion for the jury: Starr v. Torrey, 2
Zab. 190; PResident v. Hart, 3 Day491;
Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447;
Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Pa. St. 289;
Warren v. Warren, 1 C., M & R. 250.
As to the presumption from the send-
ers' usual course of business, see Heth-
erington v. Kemp, 4 Camp. 193 ; Skilbeck
v. Garbett, 7 Q. B. 846; Ward v.
Londesborough, 12 C. B. 252; Spencer
v. Thompson, 6 Ir. C. L. 537.
Whether the postmaster could be held
responsible, see Whitfield v. Despencer,
Cowp. 754; Hordern v. Dalton, I C. &
P. 181 ; Ford v. Parker, 4 Ohio St.
576 ; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. 230 ;
1tzgerald v. Burrill, 106 Mass. 446;
Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474,
and cases cited ; Fos:er v. Metts, 55
Miss. 77 ; Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio
523; Hutchins v. Brackett, 22 N. H.
252 ; 2 Thomp. on Neg. 819, 898.
Notice sent by mail to South Carolina,
during the rebellion, was held invalid:
Harden v. Boyce, 59 Barb. 425; Todd
v. Neal, 49 Ala. 266 ; Donegan v. Wood,
Id. 242; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall.
14; Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20;
Citizens' Bank v. Pugh, 19 La. Ann.
43; Shaw v. Neal, Id. 156; Lapeyra
v. Robertson, 20 La. Ann. 399.
Where a substituted service of pro-
cess, &c., by mail, is authorized by stat-
ute, a strict compliance therewith must
be shown: Rogers v. Rogers, 3 C. E.
Green 445; Tate v. Tale, 11 Id. 56;
Gaffney v. Bigelow, 2 Abb. N. C. 311,
and note ; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 435 ; J'acobs
v. Hooker, I Barb. 71 : Anonymous, 25
Wend. 677 ; Chautauque Bank v. Risley,
6 Hill 375; People v. Alameda Co., 30
Cal. 182; Gray v. Palmer, 9 Id. 616;
Sharp v. Daugney, 33 Id. 505; Wallace
v. Wallace, 13 Wis. 224 ; Bitten v.
Grtilth, 16 Hun 454 ; Foley v. Connelly,
9 Iowa 240; Clark v. Adams, 33 Mich.
159 ; Wilson v. Basket, 47 Miss. 637.
As to mistakes or omissions in the
name or address, see Walter v. Haynes,
Ry. & Moo. 149 ; Gordon v. Strange,
1 Exeh. 477 ; Oothout v. Rhinelander,
10 How. Pr. 460; Smith v. Smith, 4
Green (Iowa) 267; Leonard v. New
York Bay Co., 1 Stew. Eq. 192 ; Likens
v. McCormick, 39 Wis. 313; Scorpion
Co. v. Marsano, 10 Nev. 370.
Such service is effected generally,
only from the time when the notice is
received: May v. Rice, 108 Mass. 150;
Beg. v. Leominster, 2 B. &S. 391 ; Reg.
v. Slawstone, 18 Q. B. 388; Colvill v.
Lewis, 2 C. B. 50; Reg. v. Richmond,
E., B. & E. 253.; Stevens v. Wheder,
43 Wis. 91 ; Schenck v. McKie, 4
How. Pr. 245 ; Peebles v. Rogers, 5 Id.
208; Crittenden v. Crittenden, Id. 310 ;
Morris v. 3orange, 17 Abb. Pr. 86;
see, however, Radcliff v. Van Ben-
thuysen, 3 How. Pr. 67 ; Van Home v.
Montgomery, 5 Id. 238; Eliott v. Ken-
nedy, 26 Id. 422 ; Schuhardt v. Roth,
10 Abb. Pr. 203.
J. H. STEWART.
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A public street is a public highway and a sidewalk is a part 
of the street.
In Indiana there are no common-law offences. Criminal 
prosecutions can only
be maintained for such offences as are prescribed by statu
te, but the courts resort to
the common law for a definition of the terms of a statute.
The permanent obstruction of a street is in itself an unlawful 
act.
The right of an adjacent proprietor in and to a highway 
is one of which the
legislature itself cannot deprive him without compensanon; 
nor can a municipal
corporation.
If a municipal corporation place a permanent obstruction 
in the street it is guilty
of maintaining a nuisance.
E ven in England the Queen has no power to authorize 
the permanent obstruction
of a public highway.
The placing of an obstruction where it materially encroaches 
upon a street, is
such an unlawful act as injures the citizens who are lot-owners 
on the street, and who
have a right to have the street maintained its fuill width, 
free from all obstructions of
a permanent character.
This is such a right as may be vindicated either by injunction or by 
indictment,
and its violation is established by evidence of a permanent 
encroachment upon the
street.
A building of a permanent nature, twenty-three feet 
long, seven feet high and
three feet and eleven inches wide, situated upon one 
side of a pavement in a densely
inhabited city, which pavement is constantly used 
by the inhabitants for a passage
way, is per se a nuisance.
The entire width of a sidewalk must be maintained 
convenient and safe for the
use of the public.
APPEAL by the state from a judgment acquitting 
the appellee
of the offence of maintaining a public nuisance.
1
At the trial an instruction was aslked by the 
state as follows:
"If it is shown by the evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that
Market street and the sidewalk thereof is 
situated in the city of
Indianapolis, in a densely populated neighborhood, 
and constantly
used by the citizens of the state for the purpose 
of passage and
repassage as a public highway, and was so situated 
and used on the
12th day of May 1880, and the defendant on that 
day was occupy-
ing and maintaining on said sidewalk a building 
of a permanent
nature of the length of twenty-three feet, 
and of the width of
three feet eleven inches, and of the height 
of seven feet, and that
said sidewalk was fifteen feet wide except 
where said building was
I In Indiana, where an appeal in a criminal case is 
taken by the state from a judg-
ment of acquittal, and the judgment is decided to 
be erroneous, no new trial is
granted but the appeal is sustained at the costs 
of the defendant.
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situated, and that where said building was situated but eleven feet
remained for the passage of said citizens of said state, you should
find the defendant guilty, such an obstruction of a public highway
being a nuisance within itself." This instruction was refused by
the court, yet, upon its own motion, one was given precisely the
same, except that the last clause was omitted and the following
clause substituted: "and that the obstruction essentially interfered
with the comfortable enjoyment of said sidewalk."
Cropsey & Cooper and John B. Elam, for the state.
J. L. Mitchell, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The effect of the substitution by the court of the
last clause was, to very materially change the meaning and force of
the instruction. The theory of the instruction, as originally written,
is very different from that asserted by the instruction as framed by
the court. The instruction asked by the prosecution asserts that
it is sufficient for the state to prove the existence of a permanent
obstxuction in the highway, while that framed by the court affirms
that it is not sufficient to show the existence of such an obstruction,
but that the state must show in addition that, "it essentially inter-
fered with the comfortable enjoyment of the sidewalk."
A public street is a public highway, and a sidewalk is a part of
the street: Common Council v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9; State v. Mathis,
21 Id. 277. The common-law doctrine was, "that a public high-
way was a way common and free to all the king's subjects to pass
and repass at liberty," and that an unauthorized obstruction was
indictable and punishable as a nuisance. Nor was it necessary to
show anything more than that Ihere'was a permanent obstruction
of the public way: People v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 396; State v.
Woodward, 23 Vt. 92; Davis v. Mayor, &c., 14 N. Y. 524; Com-
monwealth v. King, 13 Met. 115; Harrow v. State, 1 Iowa 439.
Counsel for the appellee argued with much force and ingenuity,
that the common-law doctrine does not prevail in Indiana, for the
reason that our state prescribes an essentially different rule. It is
indeed true, as counsel asserts, that we have no common-law
offences, and that criminal prosecutions can only be maintained for
such offences as are prescribed by statute; it does not, however,
follow from this that there is no such thing as an indictable public
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nuisance under our statute. In Bush v. State, 37 Ind. 431, it
was held that there is such an offence, although the statute does
not specially define a public nuisance. In that case it was held, that
" the phrase public nuisance had a very definite meaning ih the law,
before the statute was adopted." If the case cited should be fol-
lowed to its logical consequences it would require us to hold that
what was at common law a public nuisance is. such under our stat-
ute, and that permanently obstructing a highway is per se a public
nuisance, because it was always such at common law. We are
inclined to believe this to be the correct ruling.
Upon the assumption of the appellee that the state must show
an unlawful act, injurious to the citizens of the state, and one
which essentially interferes with either the free use of property or
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, the conclusion which
he deduces is an incorrect one. The permanent obstruction o a
public street is in itself an unlawful act, especially interfering with
the free use of property as well as the comfortable enjoyment of
life. The right of an adjacent proprietor, in and to the highway, is
one of which the legislature itself cannot deprive him without com-
pensation, nor can the municipal authorities, broad and comprehen-
sive as their powers are, devote the street to private purposes :
Ra ynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38; St. Vincent, fc., v. City/, 32 Am.
Rep. 286.
So far does this rule go that the municipality is itself guilty of
maintaining a public nuisance if it places a permanent obstruction
in the public street: Wartman v. _Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St.
202; State v. Laverack, 84 N. J. Law 201. Even under the
British form of government the king had no power to authorize the
permanent obstruction of the public highway: Viner's Abr., Yui-
sance. The existence of the permanent obstruction in the high-
way is, therefore, such an unlawful act as injures the citizens, who
are lot owners on the street and who have a right, as an essential
incident to the enjoyment of their property, to have the street
maintained its full width, free from all obstructions of a permanent
character. This is such a right as may be vindicated either by
injunction or indictment, and its violation is established by evidence
of a permanent encroachment upon the streets: Smith v. State, 3
Zab. 712; Moyamensing v. Long, 1 Pars. 145; Woods's Law, Nui-
sances, sect. 252; Langsdale v. Bonton, 12 Ind. 467. It is upon
the doctrine liere affirmed that the case of Pettis v. ohnson, 56
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Ind. 539, proceeds. There this court held that a stairway erected
upon a public alley of a city by express authority of the munici-
pal officers, was per se a public nuisance, against which an adjacent
proprietor might enjoin. The same general doctrine is declared
in the late and well considered case of Commonwealth v. Blaisdell,
107 Mass. 234.
The conclusion upon principle as well as from authority, must be
that if the unlawful act of obstructing a public highway, did injure
others than those owning real estate upon the street, such unlawful
act would be of itself a public nuisance.
Broader and more comprehensive rights than those of adjacent
proprietors, as well as a far more numerous class of citizens than
those owning lots abutting on the street, are, however, injuriously
affected by the unlawful obstruction of a public highway. All the
citizens are affected, for, "a highway," to adopt one of the defini-
tions found in the books, "is a road which every citizen has a right
to use."
The right to pass and repass upon a public highway is not
restricted to any part, for, "the public are entitled, not only to a
free passage along the highway, but to a free passage along any
portion of it not in the actual use of some other traveller:" 1
Hawks. P1. Cr., ch. 32, sect. 11; Angell on Highw., sect. 226.
The same doctrine is declared by this court in Garton v. City, 57
Ind. 429, where it is held that the entire width of a sidewalk must
be maintained convenient and safe for the use of travellers. In
Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35, the same general principle is
explicitly affirmed. The question in all cases of the character of
the present one is not, whether travel was interfered with, but
whether there was an unlawful encroachment upon a public street
by the erection of a permanent obstruction.
The citizens of the municipality who are invested with the local
government are all affected by the obstruction of a street, because
all in the capacity of tax-payers, are charged with the burden of
,o keeping the streets as that they may be used in safety by the
citizens of the state. So far does the law upon this subject extend
that even though the obstruction be placed on the street by a
wrongdoer, the municipality may, under some circumstances, be
liable for any injuries which may be caused by such an obstruction.
It cannot be doubted that in keeping the streets clear and free from
obstructions, all the tax-payers of a municipality are interested,
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and therefore the obstruction of a street necessarily affects a very
great number of the citizens of the state. Upon the facts hypo-
thetically stated in the instruction, the rule of law must be that the
obstruction is per se a nuisance, or we might have on the same
street, indeed oh the same square, an obstruction pronounced by
one jury to be a nuisance, and another of the same character and
dimensions, by another jury declared not to be a nuisance. If
any other rule than that insisted upon by the state is declared to
be the law, each particular case, although the facts should be
identically the same, might be differently decided, the result in
each case depending upon the peculiar views of the jury trying the
cause. The only just and safe rule is, that a permanent structure
materially encroaching upon a public street in a thickly inhabited
part of a large city, is a nuisance of itself. There is no injustice
in this rule, because no doctrine is more seasonable or more firmly
settled than that the streets of a city are for the use of the public,
and that no one can have the right to divert a street, or any part
of a street, to private purposes, and one who does so divert a street
ought not to be permitted to compel the state to show specifically
that the enjoyment of the life or property of some part of the citi-
zens was essentially interfered with. The necessary consequence
of the unlawful act is to essentially interfere with the enjoyment
of life and property, and this being so it was the duty of the court
to instruct the jury as matter of law, that an obstruction of the
character described in the state's instruction was of itself a nuisance.
If it be the law, as it unquestionably is, that an unlawful encroach-
ment upon a public highway by the erection of a structure of a
permanent character, in a popular part of a large city, is an act
injuriously affecting all the abutters, tax-payers, and indeed, all the
citizens of the state, there is no reason for instructing that the
state must supplement the evidence of the character and location
of the obstruction with evidence showing that it interferes with the
comfortable enjoyment of the sidewalk.
The character and location of the obstruction being shown, it
was the duty of the court to have told the jury, as a matter of law,
that such an obstruction was a public nuisance. Unless the con-
clusion from the existence of the facts be deemed and treated as
matter of law, the result will be a line of cases with precisely the
same facts, but with diverse judgments, varying with the views of
the jury by which each cause is tried. The rule which must
guide is one of law, and should be declared by the court, and as
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the rule of law was correctly expressed in the instruction asked, it
should have been given.
The instruction given by the court was of such a character as
to convey to a man of ordinary capacity an incorrect view of the
law applicable to the case. As we have already shown, the rule at
common law is beyond all question, that a permanent and material
encroachment upon a public street is per se a nuisance, and as we
have further shown our statute does not change that rule, it must
be held error to so instruct a jury as to lead them to believe that
in addition to showing the character, situation and surroundings of
the obstruction, it was necessary for the state to show that the com-
fortable enjoyment of the sidewalk was essentially interfered with.
But one inference can be drawn from the instruction of the court,
and that is that there must be some other facts shown in addition
to those stated in the instruction. Having hypothetically stated
all the facts which it was incumbent upon the state to prove, the
last clause of the instruction reading as follows: "and the said
obstruction essentially interfered with the comfortable use of the
sidewalk," is added, thus conveying to the jury the impression
that something more than the facts recited in the instruction must
be proved. If the fActs stated in the part of the instructions pre-
ceding the clause just quoted were all that the state need prove,
then by adding that clause an erroneous rule was declared, because
that clause asserts that in addition to the facts recited the state
must show some other fact or facts.
The distinction between the temporary occupancy of public
streets for commercial or building purposes and its permanent
obstruction is well illustrated in the leading case of Woods v.
fears, 12 Ind. 515. It is not doubted that sidewalks may, when
authorized, be temporarily occupied for private purposes, but tem-
porary occupancy for authorized private purposes is quite a differ-
ent thing from the erection of a structure of a permanent character.
But even with respect to temporary use of such streets it must be
borne in mind that it may go to the extent of becoming a public
nuisance: Rex v. Russell, 6 East 427; Commonwealth v. Pass-
more, 1 S. & R. 219; Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Penn. St. 65;
Commonwealth v. Milliman, 13 S. & R. 403.
Appeal sustained at costs of appellee.
The statute under which the defendant son who shall erect, or continue, or main-
was indicted is as follows: "Every per- tain any public nuisance, to the injury of
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any part of the citizens of this state, shall
be fined not exceeding one hundred dol-
lars."
There are no common-law offences in-
dictable in the state of Indiana. All
crimes are defined by statute. The
words "public nuisance" are used- in
the statute, but reference is had to the
common law for a definition of this term.
This is the uniform practice of the courts.
Notw'thstaudiug all crimes are declared
to be statutory, the courts cannot get en-
tirely rid of the common law, nor can the
legislature aid them to do so. " There
is in, perhaps, all cases of statutory
crime a greater or less mingling of com-
mon-law principles with the statutory.
words. Indeed, there is no place where
the principles of the common law pre-
vail, not even within the jurisdiction of
the United States courts, or in states
where they have no common law crimes,
where statutory crime, pure and simple,
and as an existence entirely separate from
the common law, is known. The stat-
ute may be the strong swimmer, that
boasts of being moved by no current,
and of possessing all force in its own
arm; still, around it, in all its strength,
and in all its parts, and constantly bear-
ing it up, is the ever-present ocean of
the common law :" Bish. on Stat. Cr.,
sec. 364.
Judge WASHINGTON, in U. S. v. Jones,
3 Wash. C. C. Rep. 215, charged the
jury: "If a statute of the United
States uses a term, which is known, and
its meaning fully ascertained by the
common or civil law, from one or the
other of which it is obviously borrowed,
no doubt can exist that it is necessary
to refer to the source whence it is taken,
for its precise meaning." MAXHALL,
C.J., said, in U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat.
630: "Of the meaning of the term
robbery, as used in the statute, we think,
no doubt can be entertained. It must
be understood in the sense in which it is
recognised and defined at common
law." The same rule has been laid
down in the following cases: U. S.
v. Wilson and Ibrter, Bald. 78 ; U.S. v.
Durkee, 1 McAllister 196 ; Apple v.
Apple, 1 Head 349 ; State v. Flenming,
2 Strob. 464 ; U. S. v. MagiUl, 1 Wash.
C. C. 463; U. S. v. Armstrong, I Curt.
451 ; Adams v. Turrentine, 8 Ired. 147 ;
Kitchen v. Tyson, 3 Murphy 314; Maya
v. Wilson, I N. H. 55 ; Thurber v. Black-
bourne, 1 Id. 242 ; RICHARDSON, C.
J., in Tappan v. Bellows, 1 N. H. 107;
Medical Col. of Ohio v. Zeigler, 17 Ohio
St. 52 ; Moore v. Vance, 1 Ohio 19 ;
"Turney v. Yeoman, 14 Id. 218; Mer-
chant's Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 411 ;
Oakes v. Munroe, 8 Cush. 287; Bacon
v. Charlton, 7 Id. 583; Hillhouse v.
Chester, 3 Day 211 ; Buckner v. Real
Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 536; Bx parte
Vincent, 26 Ala. 145 ; Burk v. State, 27
Ind. 430; State v. Taylor. 29 Id. 517.
But where municipal legislation de-
clared certain acts done, to amount to
the crime of piracy, the terin "piracy"
used in the statute is not sufficient to
give the United States courts jurisdic-
tion of the cause of action; such a
"piracy" not being an offence against
the common law, of which offence the
United States courts have jurisdic-
tion: Dole v. N. B. Mutual Ins. Co., 2
Clif. 418.
ENGLISH JAsEs.-At common law,
there is no doubt that the obstruction of
a public highway, so as to make it less
commodious to the public, is a public
nuisance: 2 Roll. Abr., Nuisance B. ;
Overton v. Freeman, 11 C. B. 867 ; Rex
v. Griesly, I Vent. 4; as if a man with
a cart use a common pack and prime
way, so as to plough it up and render it
less convenient for riders : Regina v.
Leech, 6 Mod. 145 ; a stile across a
footpath, raised to a greater height than
usual: Bateman v. Burge, 6 C. & P.
391, per PARK, J.; but building a
house in a larger manner than it was
before, whereby a street is darkened
more than it was previously, is not a
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nuisancia: Rex v. Webb, Ld. Rayin.
737 ; obstructing a street, by an inn-
keeper, with carriages, even where he has
been in the habit of so doing for a long
time, is indictable: Gerring v. Barfield,
16 C. B. N. S. 597; so carrying an un-
usual weight with an unusual number of
horses: Rex v. Egeriy, 3 Salk. 83; so
carrying on a business in the street, as
having a wagon standing before his ware-
house, loading and unloading, so that no
carriage could pass on that side, and even
foot-passengers were incommoded: Rex
v. Russell, 6 East 427 ; a stage-coach
standing in the street plying for pas-
sengers : Rex v. Cross, 3 Campb. 224 ;
where the defendant owned a small tim-
ber-yard, and was in the habit of laying
long timber in the street and cutting them
into pieces, so that he could get them into
his yard, the plea of necessity was held
bad, the court saying: "If an unreason-
ble time is occupied in the operation of
delivering bedr from a brewer's dray into
the cellar of a publican, that is certainly
a nmsance. A cart or wagon may be
unloaded at a gateway; but this must be
done with promptness. So as to the
repairing of a house, the public must
submit to the inconvenience occasioned
necessarily in repairing the house ; but
if this inconven;ence be prolonged for
an unreasonable time, the public has a
right to complain, and the party may be
indicted for a nuisance. The rule of
law upon this subject has been much
neglected, and great advantage would
arise from a strict and steady application
of it :" Rex v. Jones, 3 Campb. 230 ;
Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 407 ; even
general convenience to the public is no
excuse to lay down tramways upon
which carriages for the carrying of pas-
seugers are run: Reg. v. Train, 2 B. &
S. 640 ; telegraph poles, although there
was plenty of space left for the public :
Reg. v. United Kingdom Electric Tel.
Go., 6 Law T. 378; breaking up the
streets to lay down gas-pipes: Ellis v.
S effield, etc., 2 El. & B. 767; but not
for lighting the town: Reg v. Longton
Gas Co., 2 Ell. & Ell. 651 ; even an
obstruction for one day, although it does
not seriously inconvenience the public;
is indictable as a nuisance: 9 Cox C.
C. 137, 174 ; so a contraction of the
width of the highway: Rex v. Wright,
3 B. & Ad. 681 ; Regina v. London,
etc., Ruilway Co., 1 Cor. N. & H. Rail-
way Cases 317 ; but distributing hand-
bills on the street, whereby a crowd
is gathered, was held not indictable :
Rex v. Sarinon, 1 Burr. 516 ; nor for
throwing down skins in the streets,
whereby a personal injury is occaioned:
Rex v. Gill, 1 Str. 190; where the work
was in some degree a hindrance, but
was advantageous in a greater degree to
other users of the river, it was held in-
dictable: Rex v. Ward, 4 Ad. & E.
384, overruling Rex v. Russell, 6 B. &
C. 566 ; where the defendant permitted
trees to grow over into the highway and
obstruct it, he is not liable to indict-
ment: Walker v. Horner, Law Rep. 12
Q. B. Div. 4.
AMERicAx C SsEs -- It is an indicta-
ble offence to place a fruit stand on the
pavement of a street, although the de-
fendant pay rent to the owner of the
adjoining premises: Com. v. Wentworth,
Bright. Rep. (Penn.) 318 ; constable's
sale in street: Com. v. Afilliman, 13 S.
R. 403; so sale of goods by an auc-
tioneer, and the plea of custom is not
good; Com.v. IPssnorre, I S. & R.
217 ; that the thing complained of fur-
nishes on the whole, a greater conve-
nience to the public than it takes away,
is no defence, "fbr on the same princi-
ple that the defendant might carry his
wharf twelve feet, he could justify ex-
tending it further; or any other man
might excuse a similar intrusion ;"1
Respnblica v. Cadwdl, 1 Dal. (Penn.)
150 (1785) ; nor where a road had not
been used for ten years, and the public
bad acquired a right to use a portion of
the land of a private owner: Elkins v.
State, 2 Humph. 543 ; it is no defence
